Danilo Zolo
1. The decline in post-classical and classical models of democracy
Today it is not clear that What does the word "democracy." Those who casually use the term "democracy" do or intellectual laziness or lack of knowledge of the problems. Very often it is political rhetoric and ideological presumption West. In the United States of America, in particular, political leaders use the term democracy to enhance its system and to discriminate on the international stage what they call "rogue states" ( rogue states).
There is no doubt that the classical meaning of "democracy", dating from the Athenian experience, belongs to a remote history that now has little to teach us. Today, in times of global expansion of political power, economic and military, no serious scholar believed that the model of agora and ecclesia has any relevance. And no one today believes that political parties are really the organizations 'representative' faithfully transmitting to the top of state power needs and expectations of the voters.
addition to this, today we must recognize that the "doctrine of pluralistic democracy, affirmed in the West after the Second World War, is declining. In modern societies - had supported Joseph Schumpeter (1 ) - Democracy is founded on three principles: the plurality of elites compete among themselves for the conquest of political power, the alternative nature of their programs, a free and peaceful electoral competition for the choice by the people 's elite which must govern. Authors such as Robert Dahl, John Plamenatz, Raymond Aron, Giovanni Sartori ( 2) argued, following Weber and Schumpeter, that the management of power must necessarily be entrusted to a small ruling class, composed of politicians by trade, with competence. To the public "jurisdiction" of the citizens may be restricted depending on the choice of the 'elite which is entrusted with the power to command and to obey as disciplined.
In recent decades, in the context of "globalized" society, increasingly diverse and complex, including the doctrine of pluralistic democracy has proved unrealistic. In recent years the West has shifted from industry companies and work to post-industrial society dominated by information-technology revolution and the overwhelming power of corporations international market economics have spread to every corner of the earth. The political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of a few superpowers and international law is now subject to their absolute will. The political sovereignty of nation states has been greatly weakened, while the function of parliaments has been limited from the power of public and private bureaucracies, including the constitutional courts and judicial bureaucracy. At the same time the executive has assumed a hegemonic function by altering the division of powers that had been the hallmark of eurocontinentale Rechtsstaat and the rule of law Anglo-American.
Today it is not even clear what are the "political parties". As argued Leslie Sklair and Luciano Gallino, democracies are dominated by the hegemony of some economic and political elites in the service of private interests Untouchables ( 3). It is the so-called "new transnational capitalist class that dominates the processes of globalization from above of crystal towers of metropolises like New York, Washington, London, Frankfurt, New Delhi, Shanghai. In this context, the party system is a device "self" in the sense that the parties operate in a circle as the source of its legitimacy and reproduction.
parties do not play the role of aggregate political demands emerging from society and put them in competition with each other in parliament. Parties are not in any sense of the channels of political representation, voluntarily supported by its own militants and voters. Using a systematic tool of television, political leaders go directly to citizen-consumers by highlighting their "propaganda products" according to skillful marketing strategies television. Their function is essentially to invest their power and their money by informal financial channels and often hidden, through which they distribute financial resources, benefits and privileges. In this way, feed the solidarity and interests on which they are governed and who often have transnational dimensions ( 4).
addition, there are no reliable analysis that showed that parties tend to agree among themselves on everything that is essential for them in the bureaucracies of the national political system. A striking example is the impressive auto-party funding: funding is subtracted from any effective control legislation, control and sanction ( 5). Consider, for example, that in Italy public expenditure on party funding than health care costs, which are impressive. And the collective solidarity enables all parties to compete with others in the "corporate polyarchy." In Italy, these organizations is not an exaggeration to call "quasi-state" as the Mafia, "n'drangheta" Calabria, the Camorra, the Roman church, the most powerful banks, big business, drug traffickers , the "secret services". In keeping with these entities' public-private "the majority of parties operating outside the formal political system and, sometimes against the law of State. Just think - always with reference to Italy - the dense network of public procurement, which is the parent company of billionaire extortion and corruption of political leaders, public officials and managers high level.
As argued Alan Wolfe (6 ) and Norberto Bobbio ( 7), in modern democracies living facilities of a "dual state". It is a dual state in the sense that there is visible next to a state in Western democracies an "Invisible State", a sort of foundation of formal democratic unfathomable. Bobbio indicates a specific area of \u200b\u200bthe power of invisibility: it is the dual intertwining between national policy and the global economy. Especially in Italy, the political class has a large "invisible power" through the direct or indirect management of economic activities in fact removed from the control and inspection of the ordinary and administrative jurisdiction. Occult practices cover a wide variety of functions related to the thousands of institutions that depend on government, particularly the Regions, the Provinces and the Municipalities. In this way the political class affects the urban projects of the city, the administration of health services, local security funds, credit companies, trade with foreign countries and even the administration of Justice (8 ).
As to the ability of voters to judge the democratic political competition and choose the 'elite worthwhile to carry out government functions, it is very uncertain. Even in relation to issues simpler and more compelling - environmental pollution, war, the criminal justice system, prisons, nuclear power, water supply, etc.. - Public opinion and therefore the political consensus is based on information easily controlled and on a rational assessment. The complexity of the questions you add the barrier of the tools of mass communication, the TV first. What remains is the freedom voting "negative", meaning that the voter is free to participate or not participate in elections and to express a preference election. But are not the voters decide which political issues are to be submitted to them: someone before them and in their place to put down what their decision and what they reserve for secret agreements, eliminating any risk of institutional destabilization. We are therefore in the presence of a regime that I believe can be called "tele-post-democratic oligarchy": a post-democracy in which the vast majority of citizens do not "choose" and not "elect", but ignores, silent and obedient (9 ).
Public opinion in of a State does not have independent sources of information from the system telecratico nationally and internationally. The local television stations are connected to the great structure of the international media. The transnational corporations have the monopoly of television broadcasting are mainly located in the United States are all members of the OECD: these include AOL-Time-Warner, Disney, Bertelsmann, Viacom, Tele-Communications Incorporated, News Corporation, Sony, Fox. The advertising spreads throughout the world strongly suggestive symbolic messages that highlight the wealth, consumption, entertainment, competition, success, the seduction of the female body. The Communication "subliminal" stimulates the acquisitive instincts of a key political conservative and strongly inspired by the values \u200b\u200bof the capitalist economy now dominant globally ( 10). Thanks to television the expansion in industrial production and consumption not only inspired by the strategies of political elites in power, but also dominates the popular imagination: it is a profound and generalized conformism that influence the pace of life, the value choices and the political leanings of the vast majority of citizens. Bobbio argued that the excessive power of television has caused a reversal of the relationship between citizens and citizens controlled controllers: they are the small minority of party officials and elected officials to control the masses of voters and not vice versa (11 ). And further because the subordination of the citizens are opinion polls. Under the guise of scientific rigor the "polls" are used to analyze but not to manipulate the so-called "public opinion". The opinion polls agencies in the service of elites most influential record public responses to their questionnaire and thanks to television influence public opinion through the selective dissemination of survey results.
Again the Italian experience is exemplary. The power for nearly two decades dominated the Italian public opinion is essentially that television, under the monopoly of a leader - Silvio Berlusconi - which owes its success to its extraordinary wealth, the ownership of a large part of private television channels and political control of public television.
The post-classical doctrine of democracy had come to support the concept of "representation" kept a sense only as a social division of labor. Kelsen had gone up to say that the Parliament represents the people not so different from what, according to the doctrine of the monarchy, hereditary ruler of the person or officials appointed by him representing the people, nation or state. In modern democracies the will of the executive power - the Parliament is now substantially free of autonomic functions - in fact replaces the alleged will of the "sovereign people", and popular sovereignty is no longer a "totemic mask" (12 ). In a realistic vision of "post-democracy" contemporary "representatives" are actually the bureaucrats and managers that "represent" voters only in the sense that they do something in their place, something that individual voters do not have the expertise the financial resources or the ability to do. In this sense, democratic regimes are different from dictatorial or totalitarian regimes only to the greater complexity of procedures for the appointment of elites and Change over time of parliamentary majorities and minorities. But the alternation of elites in power does not involve a genuine change of policy objectives and economic interests guaranteed. The economic and political elites are heavily influenced by partisan interests, from international strategies and objectives of the major global powers. In the analysis of Bobbio
democracy was understood as a set of procedural rules, compliance with which guaranteed a minimum political content: the legal protection of civil liberties, the plurality of parties and the frequency of elections (13 ). Bobbio had not only given up a defense more broad democratic institutions, but had drawn up a catalog of severe "broken promises" of modern democracy. Among others he had mentioned the popular self-paralysis due all'incontenibile expansion of public bureaucracies, the intellectual autonomy of people threatened by the cultural, social equality countered by the continued existence of capitalist forms of production, the transparency of decisions thwarted by the intervention of political parties in the fields of economics and public information ( 14).
on his own, Niklas Luhmann had argued that the political consensus of the citizens were becoming weaker. The election procedure, based on the principles of general suffrage, equality of the vote and its secrecy did not express the so-called "popular will", nor allowed to choose the best and most competent men. Its function, very little to neutralize and make a purely formal role of voters, allowing them to express their will with only a "yes" or a "no" against very general alternatives and reduced in number. In this way voters were inserted in a procedure that allowed the obligatory self- elites in power to assume popular support for their decisions. The so-called democratic consensus was now a fiction institutional a ritual formula of ideological justification of the policy, not the actual search for a consensus, based on the real beliefs of citizens (15 ).
My opinion is that the analysis of Kelsen, Bobbio and Luhmann, despite their realism and their sharpness, in theory, are insufficient to meet the global challenge launched in the last decades by the tele-information revolution, the globalization processes finnanziaria economic and concentration of international political power in the hands of some Western superpowers. The United States of America, in particular, have used their political and military leadership to create a series of wars of aggression - the Gulf War the 1991 wars of aggression of Serbia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Clearly, I think, that wars of aggression make it increasingly unlikely the preservation of the delicate mechanisms of democratic procedures in the Member States in which assailants attacked. In the aggressors democracy is effectively replaced by an exercise of power much more "efficient" because it concentrated in the hands of unscrupulous moralistic experts, capable of use of unconventional economic and financial resources and above all determined to severely restrict the rights of freedom citizens. And you can not overlook the fact that the war against global terrorism in whose name is used violence and repressed freedom, is itself a war that spread terror by killing innocent people with the means of mass destruction ( 16) .
There seems no doubt that we are facing a considerable loss of developmental capacity of democratic institutions. Their evolution over the last two centuries, had marked a steady progress: the revolutionary gains of the universality of human rights, suffrage and political rights, the protection of social rights within the welfare state . In aspirations of liberals - think in particular to Thomas H. Marshall - this life's course would gradually led to socialism and that is to a democracy based on equality of citizens and economic and social on the disappearance of social classes. But the development has been permanently discontinued during the last decades. Globalization has sharply in crisis welfare state and has encouraged the establishment of regimes that, while still waving the banner of "democracy" are actually oligarchies elitist, technocratic and repressive. Schemes are pure efficiency-oriented economic policy, the welfare of the ruling classes and the discrimination between citizens and have-nots, in a special way of non-migrants, often exploited and treated as servants or as slaves.
2. The twilight of the welfare state and the two concepts of "security"
In addition to what I have argued so far, one can not but recognize that the democratic welfare state or welfare state is now in crisis in the major Western countries . The highest level reached in the West from a political system in an attempt to democratic rule and economic and social relations to reduce the insecurity is undoubtedly the welfare state ( 17). The fundamental freedoms, the 'habeas corpus , private property, the negotiating autonomy, universal suffrage and political rights in general had already been formally guaranteed liberal democratic state of law. But the welfare state, beginning in the thirties of the twentieth century, had tried to go beyond the rule of law protecting the so-called Liberal "social rights" means the right to work, the right to education and the right to health, as well as a number of public services by insurance status, welfare and social security. It can be said that the welfare state has agreed to take the risk - and therefore of insecurity and fear - closely tied to a market economy, based on an approach that assumes the contractual and competitive economic and social inequality of individuals and reproduces without limits.
Today it is widely accepted that the welfare state is experiencing a serious crisis due to the processes of economic and political transformation that goes under the name of globalization. Authors such as Ulrick Beck, Loïc Wacquant, Luciano Gallino, Joseph Stiglitz, Robert Castel ( 18) have recognized that globalization has marked the triumph of market economy in a few decades by multiplying the total quantity of goods produced and therefore the total wealth . In 2000, the world's gross domestic product was U.S. $ 42 trillion, seven times more than in 1950. On the other hand, however, globalization has increased the discrimination between rich and poor countries today, the 20 richest people in the world have a total wealth of than the poorest one billion (19 ).
Regarding the crisis of the welfare state , the burden of a wide range of social risks has been placed increasingly borne by individuals rather than community, according to an approach oriented to privatize responsibility for the risk and uncertainty. This is an individualistic approach, and authoritarian at the same time, more and more distant from the values \u200b\u200bof democracy, in all its possible conceptions. This risk is particularly the privatization of health, education, work and pensions sectors in which the performance of the public budget in many Western countries tend to a progressive restriction.
Meanwhile the new wars "global" market instability, demographic changes, the great migration and changes in production systems of the richest countries have contributed to a decrease in labor wages and widespread instability contractual relationships. Global competition policy requires competition especially in the weaker inputs, starting with the workforce. In the presence of increased competition, companies tend to get rid of almost all the traditional benefits of employees to work "flexible" - a temporary, part-time or temporary in nature - that allow use the least amount of labor per unit of output
The increasing "flexibility" of the work is leading to a weakening of the whole democratic system of protections guaranteed to workers so far and their families: board, liquidation, disease, pregnancy , and so on. The relaxation techniques tend to give the report of a dimension of pure employment law. His character more and more "atypical" separates the employee from any collective dimension. The protection of trade union becomes a problem, together with the very possibility of state regulation of labor relations: the final result that emerges is the pure bargaining between the individual employer and the worker ( 20).
The general effect that results is the tendency to eliminate the democratic institutions within the framework of "pure liberal state" or "private company". The new watchwords are everywhere: privatization, the subordination of all workers, public and private, the rules of the employment relationship, any contraction of public provision that is not motivated by an absolute emergency, abandonment of full employment policies and still support the right to work, social defenses, mitigation measures for the benefit of elderly and disabled.
course, all this deepens the gap between middle class and economically ensured a varied collection of marginalized: the poor pensioners to the homeless, prostitutes, drug addicts, those suffering with AIDS, ex-prisoners, suffering mental disorders, with non-regular and clandestine, the Roma, and so on. It follows further fragmentation of the social fabric, particularly in terms of motivation civil commitment, mitigating the sense of belonging. And the growing expectation of safety channels is widespread fear in the request for a ruthless suppression of "evil" and an authoritarian exercise of power against the risks of disorder and anarchy.
All this adds, in many countries, the antagonism among the populations of Western countries and the growing masses of migrants from continental areas without development and with a high birth rate. This is the subject is too weak, but at the risk of life, are exerting pressure for the entry and acceptance in Western countries and equality of treatment. The response by the citizens at risk by this pressure "cosmopolitan" is expressed in terms of rejection and violent expulsion of immigrants, is a denial of their status as civil subjects, and finally of legal and political discrimination against the "barbarian invaders ". This conflict is writing and looks set to write the next decades some of the most mournful pages civil and political history of Western countries, starting with Italy. The Italian Government, by its decision to punish as a crime the illegal entry of non-EU foreigners in the State ( 21) and, particularly, with the proposal of June 2008 to record the fingerprints of children, as a test of incivility legal racial discrimination and bleak, totally undemocratic. In this way the government has indulged in fact the wave of hysteria and xenophobia that executioner in Italy had already invested, together, the Romanians and the Roma and Sinti minorities.
3. Democratic society by the state prison
The triumph of the economy market has not only undermined the democratic state in the form of welfare state : involving the whole experience of Western liberal democratic institutions. The term "security" is increasingly associated with the bonds of social belonging, solidarity, prevention, care, in a word security as a democratic guarantee for everyone to enjoy life away from poverty, disease, by specter of a debilitating and miserable old age, from an early death. This is a drastic shift from a conception of security as a recognition of the identity of persons and their participation in social life to a conception of security as police protection of individuals from possible acts of aggression and how repression and punishment of deviance.
Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Fear in its , argued that in times of globalization in the security of States is increasingly seen as "individual safety" based on assumption - largely based on interpretations of distorting data statistic - that we are faced with a rising crime (22 ). The "culture" focuses on the defense, the militarization of cities and individual residents live, put under the protection of certain social categories are considered "dangerous", the use of private guards and the criminal penalty (23 ). The processes of globalization is in most Western countries (and in some other Latin American countries such as Brazil, Jamaica and Mexico, who have followed the example), a fundamental transformation of the repressive and criminal policies: a transformation for Loïc Wacquant which coined the term "welfare state to the State Criminal ( 24).
In a large part of Western countries the prison administration tends to occupy the space vacated by the demobilization of large institutional sectors of political, social and economic welfare state ( 25). Member Western accord increasing importance to the policing of people and the armed struggle against crime. They do the banner of the ideology of the criminal Zero tolerance, which has established itself in the United States and that the result of globalization has also spread rapidly in many Western countries. Subject of a detailed control of the territory and relentless repression are deviant behavior, even very slight extent, the marginal subjects that do not conform to the models of social conformity and are therefore considered to be the responsible for the disorder and insecurity.
A case in point is represented by the criminal and penal policies practiced in the United States last thirty years. The American superpower occupies first place in the fight against crime, both nell'incarcerazione of a growing number of prisoners (only the Russian Federation is approached U.S. shares). In this record is added, as is known, the stubborn application of the death penalty. Since 1980 the U.S. prison population has more than tripled, reaching in 2007 the figure of more than 2.3 million inmates. The rate of imprisonment is the highest in the world: 753 people imprisoned per 100,000 (26 ), seven times more than in Italy.
These data are even more relevant when one considers that U.S. prisoners are only third of the population subject to criminal control. Indeed, there are more than four million people subject to alternative measures of probation and words, and this leads to more than six million people who are subjected to some form of criminal measures to "reduce the fear" in the country freedom (27 ).
To all this must be added that the United States is currently the trend towards privatization of the prison. This is the so-called correctional business, whose turnover has marked an exponential growth and the structure of which has assumed the characteristics of a "multinational bars", spreading in countries such as Britain, Australia, Israel and Chile in the United States in a growing number of private prisons, many of them publicly traded, are now locked up over three hundred thousand prisoners, roughly one fifth of the total prison population. The logic of this undertaking is of course the economic profit and this significantly affects the quality of prison treatment: it is now entirely abandoned the model of the prison as a place of "rehabilitation" and "re-socialization." The prisons of landfills human, not unlike the gallows, their purpose is to incapacitate and destroy deviant individuals, as dictated by the widespread fervor executioner and vindictive - think of the impressive phenomenon of Victim's Rights Movement - today enhances the healing powers of imprisonment and the death penalty (28 ).
4. Security, freedom, autonomy cognitive
face of this alarming scene begs the question: what to do? what to do in Italy, in Europe and the world? What to do in the Russian Federation? What can the progressive forces in the presence of a drift "post-democratic" that involves the entire West, spreading poverty, insecurity and fear, he resorts to cruel repressive strategies including the death penalty? The answer is dramatically difficult and I am not able to here groped an appropriate response. Moreover, I do not deny my pessimism. I personally think that pessimism is a moral duty, an act of courage. I agree with the idea of \u200b\u200bOswald Spengler who argued that "optimism is cowardice" (29 ).
I will say simply that I believe the first duty of a progressive movement that is in tune with the problems posed by globalization is to leave behind the code of Marxist certainties, but without abandoning the general world view that Marxism has left us a legacy. As written by Norberto Bobbio ( 30), Marxism has taught us to see human history from the standpoint of the oppressed and to put aside political moralism for a realistic choice and conflittualistica.
should first groped to save some values \u200b\u200band some human rights which today are among the most trampled: first, social rights and the "new rights" as, among others, the rights of foreign migrants, the right environment, the right water, the right not to be tortured and degraded by "justice" of the States, the right to peace, and not least, the right to life, today, brutally crushed by the terror of wars of aggression from the west and replication equally violent and terrorist the attacked (31 ). Also it would resist the neo-liberal attempt to dismantle even the last remnants of the welfare state looking to make the discrimination of market logic to the logic of status of individual rights and their protective function and "reassuring." This could certainly not be a precondition for the restoration of post-classical or traditional forms of democracy - now unattainable goal - but at least a minimum return of autonomy to individual subjects and a sense of solidarity in the communities in which they live. In other words, it would retrieve the positive significance to either security or freedom, assuming that security and liberty can not survive outside of political structures that dot the same time, individual autonomy and social solidarity, on ' identity of citizens as subjective rights and their ties of community in which they are politically and culturally embedded. This option would require an excess of both the rhetoric of social equality, and the myth of the political unification of the cosmopolitan world and the consequent cancellation of the very notion of citizenship and ethnic identity.
The classical idea of \u200b\u200b"social equality" is hardly feasible within the modern post-industrial societies. Caught between the need for identity and growing Certified pressure, produced by the media and the market, people seem attracted to a sort of "need for inequality, by the aspiration to realize and proclaim their difference. And they do not necessarily reach positions of privilege, but in some way to achieve their freedom in front of the wall of conformity. Especially among younger people is the fundamental fear of not being oneself, not to be anyone to fail as human beings. What the younger generation feel the need is not simply 'negative' liberty, the freedom not to be hampered by external constraints, according to the formulateorizzata by Isaiah Berlin (32 ). It aspires to something more and different: each one wants to draw the profile of his life. Each wants his fate was the result of his project on itself, not a drawing of others. He wants to control his cognitive processes, feelings and emotions: in short, sucks up to his "cognitive autonomy." For
cognitive autonomy, as the very essence of individual liberty, could mean the subject's ability to monitor, filter and interpret rationally the communications you receive. Within the company computerized legal guarantees of rights and freedoms and political rights is likely to be an empty shell if it does not include the 'cognitive autonomy "if none is available, it is impossible to form a public opinion independent of the processes of self-legitimization promoted by elites political power. In the presence of a growing persuasive means of mass communication the fate of Western political institutions seems to depend on the outcome of the battle in favor of this fundamental "human right", the 'cognitive autonomy ", which could also be called habeas mentem.
Let me conclude by adding, against the cosmopolitan utopia à la Bauman or à la Habermas, that individual autonomy does not exclude but rather implies a sense of belonging to a particular social group and culture. There is no autonomy and freedom without roots in one particular country, without identifying intellectual, sentimental and emotional with a history, culture, language, a common destiny. And there is no security, but loss and loneliness without solidarity, sharing a sense of uniformity, some spontaneous intimacy in social relations. Only those who have strong roots identity recognizes the identity of others, respect difference, seeks dialogue with others, shuns all forms of fundamentalism and dogmatism, is confident that the encounter between different cultures and civilizations of the planet is not only the condition peace but also an evolutionary heritage essential for the human species.
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Note
2. See R. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics , New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989, J. Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion, London, Longman, 1973; R. Aron, Démocratie et totalitarisme , Paris, Gallimard, 1965; G. Sartori, Democracy and definitions , Bologna, Il Mulino, 1957.
3. See L. Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class , Oxford, Blackwell, 2001; L. Sklair, "The end of capitalist globalization", in MB Steger (ed.), Rethinking globalism, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, pp. 39-49; L. Sklair, "The globalization of human rights", Journal of Global Ethics , 5 (2009), 2, pp. 81-96; L. Gallino, With the money of others. Capitalism by proxy against the economy , Torino, Einaudi, 2009, pp. 123-40.
4. See N. Luhmann, Politische Planung , Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971, especially at pp. 9-45, 53-89.
5. Referring to my essay "The 'dual state' and self-reference of the party system", in D. Zolo, Democracy and Complexity , Torino, Giappichelli, 1987 pp. 137-53.
6. See A. Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism , New York, The Free Press, 1977, trans. com. Bari, De Donato, 1981.
10. Particularly in the last decade, the integration process of communication has been so intense rapid and has legitimized the idea of \u200b\u200ba "cyber-globalism", putting the network in the world, and that is to be wrapped in a dense web of information and communication connections, not excluding the monitoring networks and cyber-espionage satellite for both industrial and military punishment of terrorism. Examples are Echelon and the UK-US agreement, which incorporates the electronic intelligence agencies of the five major anglophone countries. The next step, already well under way, is sure to be industrialization and militarization of space alien computer.
12. See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1945, trans. com. Milan, Community, 1954, pp. 69, 126.
14. See my the democratic principle. For a realistic theory of democracy , Milan, Feltrinelli, 1992, in particular pp. 121-34.
15. See N. Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie , Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowolt, 1972, trans. com. Sociology of Law, Roma-Bari. Laterza, 1977, pp. 82-3, 260-1.
16. Ben wrote Yadh Achur: "The terrorist est en fait a terrorisé " (Y. Ben Achour, Le rôle des relations internationales dans le civilizations , Brussels, Bruylant, 2003, p. 240).
17. In this regard I would refer to my essay Theory and Criticism of the rule of law , P. Costa, D. Zolo (ed.), The rule of law , Milan, Feltrinelli, 2002, pp. 17-88.
18. See U. Beck, Was ist Globalisierung? , Frankfurt aM, Suhrkamp, \u200b\u200b1997, trans. com. Roma, Carocci, 1999; U. Beck, D. Zolo, What is Globalisation? Some Radical Questions , 1999; L. Wacquant, Les prisons de la misère , Paris, Editions raisons d'Agir, 1999, trans. com. Password: zero tolerance , Milan, Feltrinelli, 2000; L. Gallino, Globalization and inequality, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2000, J. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents , New York, WW Norton & Company, 2002, trans. com. Turin, Einaudi, 2002; R. Castel, The insecure social , Paris, Seuil, 2003.
19. On the topic see L. Gallino, With other people's money , cit., Pp. 5-26, I would refer also to my Globalization. A map of the problems , Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2004, pp. 27-49.
20. See G. Gareffi, M. Korzeniewicz, RP Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism , Westport, Greenwood Press, 1994.
22. See Z. Bauman, Liquid Fear , Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006; Z. Bauman, Globalization . The Human Consequences, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, trans. com. Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001.
23. On the topic see D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, trans. com. The culture of control , Milan, Basic Books, 2001.
26. The retention rate quoted was established on 31.12.2008 (source: Prison Brief for United States of America ).
27. On the topic see L. King, Prison and globalization. The prison boom in the United States and Europe , Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006.
28. On the subject of prison as an instrument of exclusion and immobilization cf. Z. Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences , Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, trans. com. Inside globalization. The human consequences , Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001, pp. 116 to 129, see also T. Mathiesen, Prison on Trial: A Critical Assessment , London, Sage, 1990.
29. See O. Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte , 2 vols., München, Beck, 1919-22
31. On the subject I would refer to my humanitarian Terrorism. Since the Gulf War to the massacre in Gaza , Reggio Emilia, Diabasis, 2009, in particular to the 'Introduction', pp. 9-38.
32. See I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty , in I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, reprinted in I. Berlin, Liberty, edited by H. Hardy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, trans. com. Two Concepts of Liberty, in I. Berlin, Liberty, Milan, Feltrinelli, 2005.
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